Changing minds Cognitive, computational and logical approaches to belief change
International workshop – ILLC, Universiteit van Amsterdam Friday, October 29, 2004 // UvA, Roeterstraat 15, room A 303 // Time: 13.45-19.45
| abstract | program | contact | bibliography | sponsors |
Scientific committee	Johan van Benthem (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Frank Veltman (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Rineke Verbrugge (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
Organization	Fabio Paglieri (Università di Siena)
Abstract	How do people change their minds? Belief revision theory was first developed to give a formal answer to this question, following a long tradition of philosophical work on theory change. In the last two decades, the original axiomatic approach has been extensively discussed, refined, and criticized. In particular, other more realistic and computationally manageable models of belief revision have been proposed. Normative theories of belief revision advocated by philosophers and logicians (who study the question as to how people should change their minds) have been paralleled by more descriptive approaches taken by cognitive psychologists and social scientists (who want to know how people in fact do so). As a result, belief revision has become one of the most active areas of research, at the confluence between cognitive science, logic, philosophy, and AI. Nevertheless, the most crucial features of belief revision still remain unsolved – and the main reason lies in a serious lack of integration between the “formal side” and the “cognitive side” of the problem, i.e. between approaches first developed in logic, computer science and philosophy, and theoretical models and empirical evidences gathered in the field of cognitive science and experimental psychology. As a result, many questions are still unanswered: e.g., is the axiomatic approach expressive enough to capture all the relevant cognitive issues of belief revision? What is the exact relation between belief revision and information update? How is belief revision affected by communication, and by social interaction in general? How can belief revision be integrated in the overall epistemic processing of a cognitive agent? To answer these questions, the study of belief revision has to be pursued in a highly integrated framework, bringing together different approaches from different disciplines – starting with cognitive psychology. How should cognitive-oriented studies of belief revision impact on the formal models? What kind of conceptual framework is more adequate to account for empirical data on the development of reasoning skills (e.g. in false belief tasks, balance scale tasks, etc.)? How can we systematically describe the relation between formal models (e.g. axiomatic theories) and computational systems (e.g. neural networks) for modeling cognitive belief revision? What is the connection between belief revision and other related cognitive and logical issues, like information update, argumentation, epistemic logic, and communication protocols? How is belief revision to be conceived in a simulative socio-cognitive framework, e.g. in multi agent systems? This workshop brings together leading experts in several related fields to discuss these issues and compare distinct approaches. Different paradigms need not to merge, since they might turn out to address complementary aspects of belief change. But in this workshop they will be confronted with each other, to clarify differences and synergies – with special emphasis on the primacy of cognitive studies. Belief revision is perhaps the most fundamental of our cognitive skills: therefore, its formal understanding cannot abstract from empirical data on belief change in humans.
	back to the top
Program	13.45 14.00 14.45 15.30 16.15 16.30 17.15 18.00 18.15 19.00 19.45 20.30	Welcome with coffee & Opening remarks [download the programme in PDF] Hans Rott (Universität Regensburg) Beliefs are in our heads, and so are our preferences: some philosophical reflections on belief revision [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Allard Tamminga (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) Cristiano Castelfranchi (ISTC-CNR, Roma) Reasons to believe: cognitive models of beliefs change [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Fabio Paglieri (Università di Siena) Maartje Raijmakers (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Belief revisions in the cognitive development of proportional reasoning: dynamics, statistical models and computational models [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Ingmar Visser (Universiteit van Amsterdam) Coffee break Wiebe van der Hoek (University of LIverpool) Model checking epistemic properties [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Geert Jonker (Universiteit Utrecht) Rineke Verbrugge (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) Beliefs and socio-cognitive interaction: belief revision in multi agent systems [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Emiliano Lorini (Università di Siena) Tea break Frank Veltman (ILLC, Amsterdam) Making counterfactual assumptions [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Andreas Herzig (IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse) Hans van Ditmarsch (University of Otago) Belief revision and dynamic epistemic logic [abstract in PDF] Commentator: Barteld Kooi (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) Concluding remarks & End of works Social dinner
	back to the top
Contact	For further information concerning the workshop, please contact paglieri@media.unisi.it
	back to the top
Bibliography	A partial list of bibliographical references on belief revision is available here.
	back to the top
Sponsors	The workshop is sponsored and financially supported by the NWO - Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek within the transdisciplinary theme Cognition and Behaviour, and it is hosted by the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) of the Universiteit van Amsterdam.
	back to the top